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Contesting Criticality:
Epistemological and Practical Contradictions in Critical Reflection
Stephen Brookfield
University of St. Thomas, USA
Abstract: Being critical is not an unequivocal concept. It is, rather, a contested idea. How the terms
critical or criticality are used reflects the ideologies of the users.
Consider the different ways people define what it
means to learn in a critical way at the workplace.
For some, critical learning, thinking and reflection
are represented by executives’ use of lateral, divergent thinking strategies and double loop learning
methods. Here adult workers learn criticality when
they examine the assumptions that govern business
decisions by checking whether or not these decisions were grounded in an accurately assessed view
of market realities. Inferential ladders are scrutinized for the false rungs that lead business teams
into, for example, a disastrous choice regarding the
way in which a brand image upsets a certain group
of potential customers. The consequence of this exercise in criticality is an increase in profits and productivity, and a decrease in industrial sabotage and
worker alienation. Capitalism is unchallenged as
more creative or humanistic ways are found to organize production or sell services. The free market
is infused with a social democratic warmth that
curtails its worst excesses. The ideological and
structural premises of the capitalist workplace remain intact.
For others, critical learning in a business setting
cannot occur without an explicit critique of capitalism. This kind of learning at the workplace involves
workers’ questioning the morality of relocating
plants to Mexico or Honduras where pollution controls are much looser and labor is much cheaper. It
challenges the demonizing of union members as
corrupt Stalinist obstructionists engaged in a consistent misuse of power. It investigates the ways in
which profits are distributed, and the conditions under which those profits are generated. It points out
and queries the legitimation of capitalist ideology
through changes in language; for example, the
creeping and ever more widespread use of phrases
such as “buying into” or “creating ownership” of an
idea, the description of students as “customers,” or
the use of euphemisms such as “downsizing” or

worse, “rightsizing” (with its implication that firing
people restores some sort of natural balance to the
market) to soften and make palatable the reality of
people losing their livelihoods, homes, marriages,
self-respect and hope. In terms of critical theory the
workplace is transformed when cooperative democracy and worker control replace the distribution of
profits among shareholders. The factory councils in
Turin, the Clydeside Shipbuilding (Scotland) sit-in,
the 1968 occupation of the Renault factory outside
Paris – these would be examples of workplace
learning in this perspective.
How is it that the same term can be used to refer
to such different activities? To understand the concept of criticality properly we need to disentangle
the different, and often conflicting, intellectual traditions informing its use. Some predominant traditions informing criticality are: ideology critique as
seen in Neo-Marxism and the work of the Frankfurt
School of critical social theory, psychoanalysis and
psychotherapy, and pragmatist constructivism.
Traditions of Criticality
Ideology critique, the first tradition to be examined,
is a term associated with Marxism and thinkers
from the Frankfurt School of Critical Social Theory,
particularly Adorno, Horkheimer, and Marcuse. As
a learning process ideology critique describes the
ways in which people learn to recognize how uncritically accepted and unjust dominant ideologies
are embedded in everyday situations and practices.
As an educational activity ideology critique focuses
on helping people come to an awareness of how
capitalism shapes social relations and imposes –
often without our knowledge – belief systems and
assumptions (i.e. ideologies) that justify and maintain economic and political inequity. To the contemporary educational critic Henry Giroux, “the
ideological dimension that underlies all critical reflection is that it lays bare the historically and so-

cially sedimented values at work in the construction
of knowledge, social relations, and material practices …. It situates critique within a radical notion
of interest and social transformation” (1983, p. 154,
155). An important element in this tradition is the
thought of Antonio Gramsci whose concept of hegemony explains the way in which people are convinced to embrace dominant ideologies as always
being in their own best interests. Gramsci points out
that because people have to learn hegemonic values,
ideas and practices, and because schools play a
major role in presenting these ideas as the natural
order of things, hegemony must always be understood as an educational phenomenon. For Jack
Mezirow–probably the most influential contemporary theorist of adult learning-doing ideology critique is equivalent to what he calls ‘systemic’
critical reflection that focuses on probing sociocultural distortions. Ideology critique contains within it
the promise of social transformation and it frames
the work of influential activist adult educators such
as Freire, Tawney, Williams, Horton, Coady and
Tomkins.
A second more psychoanalytically and psychotherapeutically inclined tradition emphasizes criticality in adulthood as the identification and
reappraisal of inhibitions acquired in childhood as a
result of various traumas. Mezirow (1981) writes of
“the emancipatory process of becoming critically
aware of how and why the structure of psychocultural assumptions has come to constrain the way
we see ourselves and our relationships” (p. 6). Using the framework of transformative learning, theorists like Gould emphasize the process whereby
adults come to realize how childhood inhibitions
serve to frustrate them from realizing their full development as persons. This realization is the first
step to slaying these demons, laying them to rest,
and living in a more integrated, authentic manner.
Different theorists emphasize differently the extent
to which the development of new social structures
is a precondition of a newly constituted, integrated
personality. Carl Rogers, for example, sees signif icant personal learning and personal development as
occurring through individual and group therapy,
and he does not address wider political factors–an
omission he regretted in his last book A Way of Being. Others, such as Erich Fromm and Ronald Laing
argue that personality is socially and politically
sculpted. Schizophrenia and madness are socially
produced phenomena representing the internal con-

tradictions of capitalism. The rise of totalitarian and
fascist regimes are made possible by the way ideologies structure personality types that yearn for order, predictability and externally imposed controls.
To radical psychologists such as Laing and neoMarxists like Fromm, individual and social transformation cannot be separated. For the personality
to be reconstituted, insane and inhumane social
forms need to be replaced by congenial structures
and the contradictions of capitalism reconciled. In
Marx’s Concept of Man (1961) Fromm argues that
the young Marx was convinced that the chief benefit of socialist revolution would be the transformation of the personality, the creation of a new kind of
humanitarian citizen.
A third tradition invoked when defining criticality is that of pragmatist constructivism. This tradition emphasizes the way people learn how to
construct, and deconstruct, their own experiences
and meanings. Constructivism rejects universals
and generalizable truths, and focuses instead on the
variability of how people make interpretations of
their experience. This strand of thought maintains
that events happen to us but that experiences are
constructed by us. Pragmatism emphasizes the importance of continuous experimentation to bring
about better (in pragmatist terms, more beautiful)
social forms. It argues that in building a democratic
society we experiment, change, and discover our
own, and others’, fallibility. Democracy is the political form embraced by pragmatism since it fosters
experimentation with diversity. Cherryholmes
(1999) writes that “pragmatism requires democracy” since “social openness, inclusiveness, tole rance and experimentation generate more outcomes
than closed, exclusive, and intolerant deliberations”
(p. 39). Elements of these two traditions are evident
in parts of John Dewey’s work and they have filtered, via the work of Eduard Lindeman into adult
education’s concern with helping people understand
their experience, and with the field’s preference for
experiential methods. In Myles Horton’s renowned
work at Highlander a largely constructivist approach was allied with a tradition of ideology critique to help activists realize that their own
experience – properly analyzed in a collaborative
but critical way – could be an invaluable resource in
their fight for social justice.
Epistemological Contradictions
The intellectual traditions that surface in the dis-

course surrounding critical reflection generate some
epistemological contradictions centering on the way
we believe we come to accurate knowledge of reality. Two of the traditions–ideology critique and
psychoanalysis/psychotherapy–work with largely
objectivist conceptions of knowledge. An objectivist conception holds that there are truths ‘out there’
waiting to be revealed and that if people study the
world long and hard enough they will stumble on
these. Such truths will be verified according to intellectual standards based on the production of verifiable evidence. Research purporting to build a
universal theory of adult learning, or to establish
best practices in adult education, springs from this
objectivist conception. This conception is firmly
modernist and representational. Ideology critique,
for example, holds that the oppressive nature of social reality is discoverable. Doing this is beset with
difficulties created by false consciousness and by
entrenched power structures working to mask their
existence; but, after long and sometimes bloody
struggle, ideology critique contends that false consciousness and hegemony can be penetrated to reveal the world as economically determined.
Knowing, in ideology critique, is coterminous with
realizing how ideology springs from, and supports,
the material conditions of capitalism. The more one
understands how social and economic inequities
continue to reproduce themselves, the closer one
comes to full knowledge. The better we understand
the nature of hegemony and the way oppression
manifests (and seeks to cloak) itself, the nearer we
are to truth. Psychoanalysis and psychotherapy also
hold out the possibility of coming to truth through
the acquisition of self-knowledge. Some argue that
clinical disturbance must be understood as a manifestation of wider social psychosis caused partic ularly by the contradictory logic and momentum of
capitalism. Others see adult self-actualization as the
removal of inhibitions, distortions and anxieties
learned through earlier family and interpersonal relationships. Both schools of thought, however, subscribe to the view that moving towards a state of
being that is more integrated and authentic is possible. In this state we have greater self-knowledge.
We know better why we are the way we are and we
know what forces are impeding us from reaching
our fullest potential. If we could just remove or
control these forces (so the argument goes) we
could ascend to a state of grace in which our inner
desires and dispositions matched more congenially

the outer features of our existence.
The subjectivist conception of knowledge, by
way of contrast, rejects the idea of any commonly
understood notion of reality. Its epistemology views
knowledge as malleable, as individually, socially
and culturally framed. There is no universal truth
waiting to be uncovered through diligent analysis.
Experience is open to multiple interpretations and
the exact meaning of any event will often be contested by participants who perceive it in wildly divergent ways. Each interpretation will, of course,
appear internally coherent, all of a piece. These
days this view is usually articulated via postmodernism, as if postmodernism represented a qualitatively new way of understanding. Yet subjectivism
has found expression in many earlier intellectual
traditions such as constructivism and pragmatism.
Constructivism’s emphasis on people as the authors
of their own experiences, the creators of their own
meanings, stands steadfastly against any idea of
their being one way of apprehending reality or interpreting meaning. In its place it argues for a multiplicity of meanings, a plethora of perceptual
possibilities. Constructivism does not deny the importance of social and cultural forces in shaping the
interpretive filters we apply to experience, but it
does argue that since social contexts are so diverse,
the possible ways of interpreting experiences will
be similarly boundless. A constructivist understanding of oppression emphasizes the role of humans as constructors of their own oppression, and
in this sense intersects with theorists of hegemony.
But constructivism does not immediately assume
that a person’s sense of oppression is necessarily
matched by any objective, material reality; that is,
by a clearly discernible state of political and economic inequity forced on unwilling subjects. Constructivism also views oppression as contextual, so
that one person can easily and continuously switch
between being oppressor and oppressed, or inhabit
both states at the same moment. Constructivism,
too, takes everyday experience seriously, not immediately assuming it to be a manifestation of false
consciousness. Pragmatism’s emphasis on experimentation and contingency also leans away from
objectivism. Although pragmatism argues for the
pursuit of beautiful consequences, these do not assume any fixed form. Beauty is seen as truly in the
eye of the beholder and open to multiple defin itions. Pragmatism holds that all theory, indeed all
practice, is provisional and open to reformulation. It

anticipates postmodernism in encouraging an ironic
skepticism regarding claims to universal explanations and in delighting in playing with unpredic table possibilities .
Practical Contradictions
The foregoing epistemological contradictions have
numerous practical consequences for adult education. Adult educators who interpret critical refle ction from within the objectivist traditions of
ideology critique and psychotherapy will be likely
to have a more fixed idea of what critically refle ctive adult education, properly practiced, looks like.
There may well be a tendency to seek ideologically
correct templates of practice such as democratic
discussion, problem-posing education and culture
circles, all of which will be taken to signify a commitment to justice and equity. For those working
within the subjectivist traditions of constructivism
and pragmatism a more flexible methodology with
an emphasis on experimentation will probably be
apparent. There will be a preference for learnercentered approaches and an openness to practices
that are invented on the spot, contextually responsive.
One set of tensions arises from the commonly
espoused commitment to a negotiated curriculum.
Those working within the ideology critique tradition are much concerned with the problem of false
consciousness and warn of the dangers of taking
students’ definitions of needs at face value. The
false consciousness position holds that since students are caught within hegemony and have had no
exposure to anti-capitalistic or anti-totalitarian possibilities, any negotiation that transpires will merely
sustain what Newman (1999) calls liberal hegemony. Since students are comfortable with what they
already know they will request more of that, meaning that liberalism and capitalism will go unchallenged. According to this view the process of
negotiation merely serves to imprison learners even
deeper within the dungeons of castle hegemony.
Further, the process of negotiation can only be undertaken authentically after students have been initiated into the ideology critique tradition and been
exposed to a variety of alternative philosophical positions. Then, so the argument goes, students can
participate in negotiation in an informed way.
Hence, a period of instruction in, say, Marcuse or
Foucault should precede any negotiation of curriculum. This position finds support in Gramsci’s

emphasis on the importance of exposing working
class students to a body of theoretical work, through
didactic means if necessary. Adult educators holding this position will fight against introducing any
negotiation of curriculum too early, arguing that
doing this only perpetuates the status quo by allowing students to make uninformed choices that
reflect their uncritical acceptance of prevailing ideology. By way of contrast, adult educators working
within the constructivist or pragmatist traditions
will be much more inclined to move straight to negotiating curriculum and to assume that students’
knowledge and teachers’ knowledge should be
treated with equal seriousness. The emphasis will
be on trusting people to decide what’s best for
them, on privileging people’s everyday knowledge
and experience. This position views the false consciousness argument as one that proves the arrogance of academics and the unjustified valorization
of theory, demonstrating as it does that ideologues
always believe that they know what’s best for other
people.
A second set of related tensions arises from the
commitment to democratic, participatory approaches usually associated with criticality. As faculty and students in an adult education doctoral
program that espouses negotiation observe, partic ipatory graduate education is often an oxymoron
(Avila et. al., 2000). The most democratically well
meaning faculty end up requiring rewriting and attendance and, at least initially, retaining curricular
control. Two democratic communities emerge – one
composed of students and one of faculty–who then
engage each other along the lines of a labormanagement negotiation. There are also the questions of race, class and gender relations amongst
faculty teams. White faculty and males can abandon
the trappings of power without losing authority.
This is much more difficult for faculty of color and
women for whom the struggle to be taken seriously
as an authority is not easily forgotten. It has often
been pointed out to me by colleagues of color that
as a white male I can easily give up power without
foregoing privilege. Finally, as Mayo (1999, p. 140)
observes, teachers who experiment with democratic
approaches are often perceived as less credible by
their students who often equate intellectual authority with traditional didactic approaches.
So where does this leave us? An awareness of
the epistemological and practical contradictions
arising from the contestation of criticality should

help people stay longer with the struggle to work in
a critically reflective way. A naïve eclecticism
which draws a pinch of criticality from ideology
critique here and a soupcon of criticality from constructivism there, and which then combines these
unreflectively, will sooner or later lead to a breakdown in communication and goodwill among those
involved. It will also result in a loss of hope regarding the possibility of change. Surfacing and acknowledging the contradictions discernible among
different traditions of criticality helps us make an
informed commitment to working critically without
being demoralized when things don’t go as planned.
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